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Evidence
by W. Randall Bassett*
Susan M. Clare"
and Simon A. Rodell***

I.

INTRODUCTION

The 2012 term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit1 included precedential opinions providing helpful guidance on
distinguishing the relevant from the irrelevant 2 and on balancing the
probative value of a criminal defendant's prior convictions with the
potential for unfair prejudice. The 2012 term also included several
unpublished decisions analyzing the admissibility of expert testimony
under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.4
Although these unpublished decisions are not binding precedent,5 they
can provide guidance to the practitioner on the Eleventh Circuit's view
of recurring evidentiary issues. The court's unpublished decisions may
be of particular interest to practitioners who typically practice in Georgia

* Partner in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. The Citadel (B.S.,
1989); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1992).
** Senior Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. The Georgia
Institute of Technology (B.S., with highest honors, 2002); Emory University School of Law
(J.D., with high honors, 2006).
*** Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Occidental College
(BA, 2003); University of Florida, Hough Graduate School of Business (M.B.A., 2008);
University of Florida, Levin College of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2008).
1. For an analysis of evidence law during the prior survey period, see W. Randall
Bassett, Geoffrey M. Drake & Madison H. Kitchens, Evidence, Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 63
MERCER L. REV. 1237 (2012).

2. See Fidelity Interior Constr., Inc. v. Se. Carpenters Reg'l Council of the United Bhd.
of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 675 F.3d 1250, 1260 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Merrill, 685 F.3d 1002, 1012 (11th Cir. 2012).
3. United States v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 1298, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 2012).
4. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
5. See 11TH CIR. App. P. 36-2, l1TH CIR.I.O.P. 7.
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state courts, which adopted a new Evidence Code-modeled after the
Federal Rules-that became effective on January 1, 2013.6
The term's two biggest evidence opinions involved constitutional limits
on the use of evidence in criminal trials. In the first case, the court
reversed a doctor's convictions for distributing controlled substances
because the doctor's Confrontation Clause7 rights were violated when
the district court allowed a government witness to testify about autopsy
reports prepared by medical examiners whom the doctor did not have
the opportunity to cross-examine.'
In the second case, the court
reversed a civil contempt judgment against a person who invoked his
Fifth Amendment9 privilege against self-incrimination and refused to
decrypt hard drives sought in a grand-jury investigation into the
dissemination of child pornography. ° This Survey describes all of
these decisions to provide the practitioner with a brief overview of the
evidentiary landscape in the Eleventh Circuit as it evolved in 2012.
II.

RELEVANCE AND PREJUDICE

A.

Relevance and Irrelevance
One of the district court's primary functions during a trial is to ensure
that the jury considers only evidence that is relevant to the matter and
not overly prejudicial. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, evidence is
relevant if "it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence" and "the fact is of consequence
in determining the action."" Under Rule 402, irrelevant evidence is
inadmissible, but all relevant evidence is generally admissible unless
excluded by the Constitution or by a federal statute or rule. 2 Although
distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant evidence is often routine,

6. Ga. H.R. Bill 24, Reg. Sess. (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
O.C.G.A. tits. 24 to 35 (Supp. 2011)) (effective Jan. 1, 2013), available at http://www.
legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-US/display.aspx?egislation=31996; see also David N. Dreyer,
F. Beau Howard & Amy M. Leitch, Dancing with the Big Boys: GeorgiaAdopts (most of)
the FederalRules ofEvidence, 63 MERCER L. REV. 1 (2011) ("Georgia has become the fortyfourth state to model its new evidence rules on the Federal Rules of Evidence.").
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8. United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217, 1231 (11th Cir. 2012).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335,
1352-53 (11th Cir. 2012).
11.

FED. R. EvID. 401.

12. FED. R. EviD. 402 ("Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following
provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; these rules; or other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.").
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each new factual situation provides an opportunity to further refine
these principles. Two Eleventh Circuit cases from the past year
illustrate the proper analysis of distinguishing the relevant from the
irrelevant.
In Fidelity Interior Construction, Inc. v. Southeastern Carpenters
13
Regional Council of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners,
a small contractor (Fidelity) alleged that the Southeastern Carpenters
Regional Council (the Union) picketed and sent warning letters to
various property owners and several general contractors to discourage
them from hiring Fidelity.14 The Union's campaign proved successful-Fidelity was removed from three jobs in a single week, and several
general contractors and property owners agreed never to use Fidelity
again.'5 Fidelity sued the Union for conducting an unlawful secondary
boycott16 in violation of the National Labor Relations Act.' 7 At trial,
the Union moved to exclude the jury from considering evidence of the
8
Union's lawful conduct during its campaign against Fidelity." Refusing to exclude the evidence, the district court concluded that the jury
could consider the Union's lawful conduct in determining the Union's
objectives, although the jury could award damages only for losses
proximately caused by the Union's unlawful conduct.' 9 The jury found

13. 675 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2012).
14. Id. at 1255-57.
15. Id. at 1257.
16. Pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169, it is an"unfair
labor practice" for a union to conduct a secondary boycott, "which is conduct that
'threaten[s], coerce[s], or restrain[s] any person engaged in commerce' with the purpose 'to
forc[e] or requir[e] any person to cease ... doing business with any other person.'"
Fidelity, 675 F.3d at 1259; see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).
17. Fidelity, 675 F.3d at 1257.
18. Id. at 1257-58.
19. Id. at 1258. The district court instructed the jury that it could consider lawful
conduct in determining the objectives of the Union, as follows:
The use of banners and peaceful distribution of handbills that do not involve
patrolling or picketing are protected by the First Amendment and are not
themselves unlawful. Likewise sending letters to third parties seeking their aid
in a labor dispute, even if the letters warned that the union plans to engage in
lawful protest, is also protected speech and not itself unlawful. However, while
these activities are not themselves unlawful, they may be considered by you as a
part of the totality of the circumstances that you review in your analysis of the
objectives of the Council's picketing.
Id. The district court further instructed the jury to award damages only for losses caused
by the unlawful conduct of the Union: "You may only award damages to plaintiffs
proximately caused by unlawful conduct of the Council. Plaintiffs are not entitled to
compensation for losses which resulted from the Council's lawful conduct." Id.
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for Fidelity and awarded $1.7 million in damages for the Union's
unlawful secondary boycott."
On appeal, the Union iterated its argument that the district court
erred in admitting evidence of the Union's lawful conduct.2 1 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the determination of whether a
union has engaged in an unlawful secondary boycott requires consideration of both the conduct and the intent of the union.2 2 In determining
intent, "[flact-finders may examine the entire course of conduct of a
union to determine whether its actions were coercive." 23 The court
noted that the content of lawful handbills, banners, and warning letters
will often offer "telling evidence of secondary intent" when evaluated "in
light of the entire campaign strategy and conduct [of a union]." 24
the
Because the evidence of the Union's lawful conduct was relevant 2to
5
Union's intent, the district court properly admitted the evidence.
In contrast, in United States v. Merrill,5 the court considered the
district court's exclusion of evidence as irrelevant under Rule 402.7 In
Merrill, the criminal defendant's company secured a contract with the
U.S. Army to provide the Afghanistan Security Forces with approximately 500 million rounds of AK-47 ammunition. 2' The contract required
the company to certify' where the ammunition was manufactured to
ensure compliance with a federal embargo on ammunition "acquired,
29
directly or indirectly, from a Communist Chinese military company."
The company used an Albanian munitions dealer to fulfill the contract.0 When a company representative arrived in Albania to oversee
the shipping operation, he realized that the ammunition was in
hermetically sealed tins with paper inside that bore Chinese characters,
revealing that the ammunition might have been manufactured in
China.3 1 Removing the papers would require destruction of the vacuum

20. Id.
21. Id. at 1260.
22. Id. at 1259.
23. Id. at 1260.
24. Id. (quoting Serv. Emps. Intl Union Local 525, 329 N.L.R.B. 638, 682 (1999)
(alterations omitted)).
25. Id. at 1260-61.
26. 685 F.3d 1002 (11th Cir. 2012).
27. Id. at 1012.
28. Id. at 1005-06.
29. Id. at 1006.
30. Id.
31. Id. The ammunition was acquired by the Albanian munitions dealer in the 1960s
and 1970s, before the United States enacted an arms embargo against China. Id. The
defendant's company asked a State Department official in an e-mail whether "it was legal
to broker Chinese Ammunition that has been sitting for about 20 years with a company in
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seal, which could render the ammunition unsafe for the battlefield.
Nevertheless, the defendant decided to open the tins, remove the paper,
and repackage the ammunition in cardboard boxes. The company then
shipped the repackaged ammunition to Afghanistan and sent at least
thirty certificates of conformance stating that the ammunition was
manufactured by the supplier in Albania, rather than by a Communist
Chinese military company.3 2
A federal grand jury indicted the defendant for conspiracy 33 to
commit false statements,34 major fraud,35 and wire fraud against the
United States, 36 and for numerous substantive offenses of major fraud
and wire fraud.37 At trial, the defendant sought to introduce evidence
that the government knew the ammunition was manufactured by a
Communist Chinese military company to support defenses of public

Albania." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The State Department official responded
that "US policy would not authorize the transaction. Exceptions to this policy require a

presidential determination." Id. (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted).
32. Id. at 1007.
33. Federal law imposes criminal penalties for conspiring to commit a federal criminal
offense or to defraud the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) ("If two or more persons
conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United
States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.").
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006) ("[Wlhoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly
and willfully-(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material
fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation;
or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; shall be fined [or imprisoned].").
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1031 (2006 & Supp. 2011) ("Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts
to execute, any scheme or artifice with the intent- (1) to defraud the United States; or (2)
to obtain money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, in any procurement of property or services as a prime contractor with the United
States or as a subcontractor or supplier on a contract in which there is a prime contract
with the United States, if the value of such grant, contract, subcontract, . . . or any
constituent part thereof, is $1,000,000 or more shall [be fined or imprisoned].").
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006 & Supp. 2011) ("'Whoever, having devised or intending to
devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be
transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign
commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing
such scheme or artifice, shall be fined [or imprisoned].").
37. Merrill, 685 F.3d at 1008.
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authority, entrapment by estoppel, and innocent intent. The district
court excluded the evidence as irrelevant.3
Affirming this ruling, the Eleventh Circuit noted that each of these
government-knowledge defenses required the defendant to "'show that
he relied on official government communications before acting in a
manner proscribed by law."' 39 Yet, the defendant never claimed that
he knew about or relied on any government communication at the time
he repackaged the ammunition and falsely certified that it was manufactured outside China.4" Instead, he learned that the government knew
the true origin of the ammunition after he had already lied to the Army
and committed his crimes.41 Because the defendant did not know about
the government's knowledge when he was committing his crimes, the
evidence could not have helped show any innocent intent.42 In other
words, the evidence could not have had "any tendency to make [the
defendant's innocent intent] more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." 3 The district court therefore properly excluded
the irrelevant evidence of the government's knowledge of the origin of
the ammunition."
B. Balancing Relevance and Prejudice Under Rule 403
Although the Rules permit admission of relevant evidence in most
cases, Rule 403 allows a district court broad discretion to "exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
a danger of ...unfair prejudice .

. . ."

The Rule calls for the district

court to balance the probative value of evidence against any risk of

38. Id.
39. Id. at 1012 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1359, 1365 (11th Cir.
1998)).
40. Id.
41. Id. The defendant also argued that the evidence was still relevant "because he
could not conceal from the government what it already knew .... " Id. As the court put
it, the defendant's argument reduced to a contention that, "for the purposes of a fraud
conviction, a lie is only a lie if it works. But 'a false statement can be material even if the
decision maker actually knew or should have known that the statement was false.'" Id.
(quoting United States v. Neder, 197 F.3d 1122, 1128 (11th Cir. 1999)).
42. Id.
43. See FED.R. EVID. 401.
44. Merrill, 685 F.3d at 1012.
45. FED.R. EVID. 403. The district court may also "exclude relevant evidence if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of... confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence." Id.
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unfair prejudice.' One of the most common sources of controversy in
this balancing test is the district court's decision whether to allow the
prosecution in a criminal case to present evidence of a defendant's prior
criminal convictions.4" In general, "[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or
other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show
that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character."4 However, such evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b)
"for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
accident."49 Nevertheless, even if evidence would be admissible under
Rule 404(b), the district court can still exclude the evidence as unfairly
prejudicial under Rule 403.50 Thus, in criminal cases the prosecution
will often offer a prior conviction to show the defendant's intent or
absence of mistake, and the defendant will respond that admission of the
prior conviction will unfairly prejudice his defense by provoking the jury
to convict based on the defendant's past criminal behavior rather than

46. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 1009-10 (7th ed. 2013) ("Analyzing and
weighing the pertinent costs and benefits [of evidence] is no trivial task .... Accordingly,
much leeway is given [to] trial judges who must fairly weigh probative value against
probable dangers."
47. For a broader review of the Eleventh Circuits recent decisions applying Rule
404(b), see the 2010 version of this Survey. W. Randall Bassett & Susan M. Clare,
Evidence, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 62 MERCER L. REV. 1163, 1164-68 (2011). For an
application of Rule 403's balancing test outside the prior-conviction context, see United
States v. Mazard, 486 F. App'x 812, 814-15 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by admitting two photographs-one of the defendant making
a hand gesture that implied he was a gang member, and one showing that a strip club was
next door to the store front from which the defendant allegedly sold drugs).
48. FED. R. EvlD. 404(b)(1).
49. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2).
50. See United States v. Miller, 959 F.2d 1535, 1538 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (noting
that evidence admitted under Rule 404(b) "must possess probative value that is not
substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice, and the evidence must meet the other
requirements of Rule 403").
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the conduct for which he is on trial.5 1 Such was the case in United

States v. Sanders.52

The defendant in Sanders was a commercial truck driver caught
hauling 153 kilograms of cocaine hidden in a load of rotting cabbages.53
At the defendant's trial on drug-trafficking and conspiracy charges, the
district court admitted into evidence the defendant's 22-year-old
conviction for selling 1.4 grams of marijuana. The government argued
that the prior marijuana conviction was probative of the defendant's
intent to enter into a conspiracy to haul the cocaine.54 In his closing,
the defendant argued to the jury that he was "just a truck driver" and
that, although he may have had "a thing for marijuana," "[tihat doesn't
mean he has a thing for cocaine." 5 Appealing his convictions, the
defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting his 22-year-old conviction for selling a small amount of
marijuana.56
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court
abused its discretion by admitting the 22-year-old conviction.57
Although acknowledging Circuit precedent holding that "[e]vidence of
prior drug dealings is highly probative of intent to distribute a controlled
substance," the court held that the 22-year-old conviction was so remote

51. Rule 404(b) also does not preclude evidence that meets one of the following
descriptions: "(1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series
of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or
(3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense." United
States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Baker,
432 F.3d 1189, 1205 n.9 (11th Cir. 2005)). For recent cases applying this exception to Rule
404(b), see United States v. Stapleton, 455 F. App'x 896, 897 (11th Cir. 2012) (evidence
relating to defendant's prior bankruptcy proceeding was admissible because the conduct
was intrinsic to the charged offenses of wire fraud and making false statements); United
States v. Carpenter, 457 F. App'x 889, 894 (11th Cir. 2012) (district court properly admitted
confidential informant's testimony that he began buying drugs from the defendant in 1995

because the testimony was necessary to complete the story of the crime and was
inextricably intertwined with the charged conspiracy); United States v. Woodley, 484 F.
App'x 310, 320 (11th Cir. 2012) (testimony that defendant robbed a cooperating witness's
cousin as the reason why the witness stopped dealing drugs to the defendant was arguably
extrinsic, but the error, if any, was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt);

United States v. Benavides, 470 F. App'x 782, 787 (11th Cir. 2012) (evidence of defendant's
uncharged participation in prior similar healthcare fraud scheme was admissible as
evidence inextricably intertwined with the charged healthcare fraud offense).
52. 668 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012).
53. Id. at 1301.
54. Id. at 1307.
55. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Id. at 1308.
57. Id. at 1315.
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that any probative value was slight.5 8 The court also emphasized that
the prior conviction was "for a street-level sale of 1.4 grams of marijuana, and the current charges involved an international conspiracy to
traffic 153 kilograms of cocaine."59 The defendant's victory proved
Pyrrhic, however. According to the Court, the "paucity of probative
value create[d] an additional problem for [the defendant]-the remoteness and dissimilarity of the prior conviction not only decrease[d] the
probative value to show intent but also diminishe[d] the potential for
unfair prejudice." ° After reviewing the abundant evidence of the
defendant's guilt, the court ultimately concluded that any error in
admitting the prior conviction was harmless.6 1 The opinion remains
important, however, because it establishes an outer temporal boundary
for the admissibility of a defendant's prior convictions, even in drug
cases where such convictions can be "highly probative" of the defendant's
intent to enter into a drug conspiracy.6"
III.

EXPERT TESTIMONY

The use of expert testimony has become increasingly more commonplace today, and most practitioners in federal courts (and many state
courts) have dealt with Federal Rule of Evidence 702. This rule allows
a party to present expert testimony, in the form of an opinion, to assist
in the jury's determination of the pertinent issues in the case. 3 To
58. Id. at 1314-15. The court noted that the defendant's prior conviction was nearly
fifty percent older than the oldest conviction that the court had previously allowed. Id.
(citing United States v. Lampley, 68 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that a 15year-old conviction was not so remote that it lacked any probative value to show intent to
distribute narcotics)). For other recent cases assessing the prejudicial impact of a prior
criminal conviction, see United States v. Cochran, 683 F.3d 1314, 1321 (11th Cir. 2012)
(holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting eight-year-old
conviction); United States v. Barry, 479 F. App'x 297, 301 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that the
district court did not plainly err by admitting, under Rule 404(b), five-year-old conduct that
was similar to the charged conduct).
59. Sanders, 668 F.3d at 1315.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1314. Indeed, one of the court's judges has expressly critiqued the Eleventh
Circuit's precedent in this area. Judge Tjoflat has stated that the court's "doctrine has
turned Rule 404(b) on its head, in so far as conspiracy cases are concerned," by
'presumptively assuming that intent is always an issue in conspiracy cases and that all
prior substantively-related acts are relevant to that intent. This is nothing more than
propensity by any other name." United States v. Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296, 1319 (11th Cir.
2005) (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring).
63. Rule 702 provides the following:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise if.
(a) the
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minimize the risk of misleading the jury through the use of opinions,
which courts have recognized can be difficult for juries to evaluate,6 4
the Supreme Court has insisted that the district courts act as gatekeepers to prevent juries from considering and basing their verdicts on
unreliable junk science. 65 In doing so, the Court has given district
courts broad
discretion and will reverse only upon a showing of abuse of
6
discretion.

In Daubert, the Supreme Court identified a non-exhaustive list of
factors for determining the admissibility of expert testimony.67 These
factors include the following: (1) whether the expert's theory can be
scientifically tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer
review and publication; (3) the known or potential error rate of the
particular scientific technique; and (4) whether the technique is
generally accepted in the scientific community.6" Since Daubert, the
Eleventh Circuit has applied a "rigorous three-part inquiry" to determine
the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702:
Trial courts must consider whether: (1) the expert is qualified to testify
competently regarding the matters he intends to address; (2) the
methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently
reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert;and
(3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of

expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony
is based upon sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliabily applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EvID. 702.
64. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993). One especially
thorny situation arises when the government offers a case agent who testifies as both a fact
witness and a code-interpreting expert. See United States v. Mallety, 496 F. App'x 984
(11th Cir. 2012). In Mallety, Judge Jordan filed a special concurrence to emphasize the
dangers of such dual-purpose testimony. Id. at 991-92 (condemning the "troubl[ing] . ..
tactic" of using a "government overview witness 0" that " ' more closely resemble [s] the grand
jury practice, improper at trial, of a single agent simply summarizing an investigation by
others that is not part of the record'" (quoting United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 54
(2d Cir. 2003))).
65. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999). "In Daubert, this Court
held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 imposes a special obligation upon a trial judge to
'ensure that any and all scientific testimony... is not only relevant, but reliable.'" Id.
(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589).
66. United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1258 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
67. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
68. Id.; see also Frazier,387 F.3d at 1262 (listing the Daubert factors).

2013]

EVIDENCE

939

scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.6 9
A.

Reliability Under Daubert

As has been typical in recent years, the Eleventh Circuit's 2012 term
included frequent forays into the second prong of this inquiry-determining the reliability of proposed expert testimony.70 This
prong is the most susceptible to repeated analysis because judging
reliability often depends on the nature of the opinion and the discipline
in which the opinion is formed and being offered. In United States v.
Barnes, 71 for example, the court addressed the defendant's challenge to
the reliability of the opinions of three expert witnesses who testified on
behalf of the government.72 The defendant in Barnes was charged with
armed bank robbery, and he defended on the grounds that the police had
arrested the wrong man. 73 The robbery began when the robber entered
the bank wearing a "thick, strange-looking beard," wielded a gun,
jumped over the counter top, and took money from the teller stations.74
The robber and an accomplice then drove away in a silver vehicle.75
During the ensuing car chase, a police officer noticed the suspects "throw
two black, fluffy objects from the windows." 76 After crashing the silver
vehicle, the suspects ran away on foot.77 Although the police officer
briefly lost sight of the suspects, he tracked down the defendant, who
appeared winded, had a flaky, sticky substance on both sides of his face,
and wore clothing similar to one of the suspects. 7 The police officer
arrested the defendant and identified him at trial as one of the suspects
he had chased.7 9
At trial, the government also presented, over the defendant's objection,
three expert witnesses: a boot-print expert, a hair-and-fiber expert, and
an adhesives expert.8 0 Based on a comparison of "tape-lift" impressions

69. Walker v. CSX Transp., Inc., 650 F.3d 1392, 1397 n.18 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Frazier,387 F.3d at 1260).
70. Last year's edition of this Survey addressed two 2011 cases discussing the
reliability of expert testimony. See supra note 1, at 1252-55.
71. 481 F. App'x 505 (11th Cir. 2012).
72. Id. at 508-11.
73. Id. at 511.
74. Id. at 506.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 507.
77. Id. The car chase ended when the silver vehicle ran a stop sign, "collided with
another vehicle, ran through a chain link fence and hit a house." Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 507, 511.
80. Id. at 508-11.
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of a boot print left on the bank counter with the print of the boots the
defendant was wearing when he was arrested, the boot-print expert
testified that the defendant's boots "could have made" the impressions
from the crime scene.8 ' However, the expert acknowledged that the
quality of the tape-lift impressions from the crime scene was insufficient
to make a more conclusive opinion."2 The hair-and-fiber expert
compared hairs found in the patrol car that transported the defendant
with hairs from a fake beard found by the side of the road where the
police officer had seen the "black, fluffy objects" thrown out the
window." The hair-and-fiber expert testified that the "'two samples
were consistent with having come from the same person or that the
person whose head hair made up that fake beard could have been the
source of the hairs found ... from the patrol car. '"'
Finally, the
adhesives expert compared a black, latex-like substance found in the
silver vehicle with a similar substance found in the patrol car that
transported the defendant
and testified that the two substances were
5
"physically consistent."
Appealing his convictions, the defendant argued that all three experts'
testimony should have been excluded as unreliable because they "r[an]
afoul of the scientific requirement of at least some degree of quantification." 6 Rejecting this argument, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that

81. Id. at 508-09. The boot-print expert found that the crime scene impressions had
the following characteristics consistent with the defendant's boots:
(1) angular elements around the perimeter and circular elements in the center
that corresponded to the bottom of [the defendant's] left boot; (2) a pattern of
circular elements in the center and chevron elements around the perimeter and
a V-shaped element at the top that was similar to the toe of [the defendant's]
boots; (3) a distinctive crescent-shaped wear characteristic that corresponded in
size, design and orientation to the upper left portion of [the defendant's] left boot.
[The boot-print expert] also found that the physical size characteristics of one
crime scene impression corresponded to [the defendant's] boot, from the heel to the
toe, including the spatial arrangement of the pattern on the sole.
Id.
82. Id. at 509. "'[d]ue to the movement when the impressions were made, portions of
the outsole did not impress[,]' and [the boot-print expert] 'couldn't see the characteristics
that [he] needed to make an identification.'" Id.
83. Id. at 509-10.
84. Id. at 510.
85. Id. at 511.
86. Id. at 513 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
defendant also challenged the reliability of the principles and methods employed by the
boot-print expert. Id. Specifically, the defendant argued that a "test print created by a
person of 'unknown height, weight, and gait' cannot be reliably compared to an impression
made by another person with a different height, weight, and gait." Id. Rejecting this
argument, the court noted that the defendant offered no authority or evidence showing that
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experts are not necessarily required to provide a quantitative basis for
their opinions.87 The rule is that experts who provide "probabilistic
opinions" must "also provide quantitative bases for them, such as
scientific studies or quantified personal experiences."88 In the defendant's case, however, none of the three experts provided probabilistic or
quantitative opinions.89 'That is, none of the experts expressed a
degree of likelihood or probability; rather, they said that something was
a possibility and explicitly declined to opine as to probability."90
Because each expert used generally accepted "methodologies that did not
allow for quantification" (and because each expert declined to express a
quantitative opinion), the district court did not abuse its discretion by
allowing the experts to testify."
In fulfilling their role as gatekeepers, the district courts retain broad
discretion to balance Daubert's reliability factors and to "avoid unnecessary 'reliability' proceedings in ordinary cases where the reliability of an
expert's methods is properly taken for granted... ,92 In Rutledge v.
NCL (Bahamas), Ltd.,93 the district court did just that. In Rutledge,
the plaintiff sued a cruise line for negligence after she was injured in a
fall as she attempted to enter an elevator on the cruise ship. A security
officer for the cruise line responded to the incident and accompanied the
plaintiff to the infirmary. The security officer testified that the plaintiff
smelled of alcohol, so he requested that she take an alcohol breath
test.9 4 The plaintiff consented, and the security officer gave the
plaintiff the test, which was a "disposable screening device for one-time
use." 5 The security officer testified that the test showed that the
plaintiff's blood-alcohol content exceeded 0.08%."6 The plaintiff moved

"footwear impression analysis is reliable only if a person of the same height, weight and
gait is used to make the comparison print." Id. Moreover, the boot-print expert testified
that his methods for footprint analysis were the standard procedures that were generally
accepted throughout the world. Id.
87. Id. at 513.
88. Id. at 513-14.
89. Id. at 514.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152-53.
93. 464 F. App'x 825 (11th Cir. 2012).
94. Id. at 826.
95. Id.

96. Id. In all fifty states, a blood-alcohol content of 0.08% is the legal limit to operate
a vehicle. See State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435,445 n.14 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2005) (citing
MARGARET C. JASPER, DWI, DUI AND THE LAw 115-16 & App. 18 (2004), which notes that
all 50 states have enacted laws stating that a blood-alcohol content of 0.08% means that
a driver is per se intoxicated).
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before trial to exclude the results of the breath test as unreliable, but
the district court denied the motion. A jury returned a verdict for the
defendant."
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the district court abused its
discretion by allowing the security officer to testify to the results of the
alcohol breath test. 8 The Eleventh Circuit was not persuaded. Noting
that the reliability of alcohol breath tests had been generally accepted
since at least 1973, the court concluded that the district court's
admission of the breath test in the case was not an abuse of discretion.99 Furthermore, the breath test used in the case would pass even
the most rigorous Daubert analysis, because the defendant had
presented evidence that the device had been subjected to laboratory tests
showing that the device was highly reliable, and the device had been
approved by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration as
conforming to the Model Specifications for Screening Devices to Measure
Alcohol in Bodily Fluids. 1°' And even though the manufacturer had
stated that the device "is not intended to legally determine blood alcohol
presence, level, or inference of intoxication[,]" this language did not
render the test unreliable.' 01 Rather, the manufacturer's statement
went to the weight the jurors might assign to the result of the test, not
to reliability.' 2
In contrast to the generally accepted alcohol-breath test, one type of
testimony that the court continues to reject is expert testimony on the
reliability of eyewitness identification. In United States v. Vega, 03 the
defendant appealed his convictions for carjacking and using a firearm
during a crime of violence. 04 The defendant argued that the district
court abused its discretion by excluding the defendant's proffered expert
witness from testifying about certain factors that would diminish the

97. Rutledge, 464 F. App'x at 827.
98. Id. "Scientific tests results are subject to the same reliability and relevancy
standards as scientific testimony itself." Id. (citing United States v. Lee, 25 F.3d 997, 99899 (11th Cir. 1994)). Although scientific evidence is usually presented by an expert, the
security officer was allowed to testify to the results of the scientific test without being
qualified as an expert. Id. at 827 n.1; see also Lee, 25 F.3d at 998-99. The court noted this
anomaly in a footnote, but did not address the issue because the plaintiff failed to raise it
in her initial brief on appeal. Rutledge, 464 F. App'x at 827 n.1.
99. Rutledge, 464 F. App'x at 828.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 828.
103. 450 F. App'x 844 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 106 (2012).
104. Id. at 846.
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reliability of eyewitness identification." 5 The court summarily affirmed on this point, noting that the court has "'consistently looked unfavorably'" upon such testimony and, in fact, has explicitly held that "'a
district court does not abuse its discretion when it excludes expert
testimony on eyewitness identification."'1 6 And, despite continued
controversy concerning the lack of reliability of eyewitness testimony,
the Eleventh Circuit seems unlikely to overrule this precedent any time
soon. 107
B.

Helpfulness to the Trier of Fact
In addition to these cases addressing the reliability of expert
testimony, the Eleventh Circuit also addressed the third prong of the
inquiry for the admissibility of expert testimony-whether the testimony
would be helpful to the jury. In Tardiff v. Geico Indemnity Co.,10s
several people who were injured in a car accident sued the car owner's
insurer for insurance bad faith." 9 At the ensuing jury trial, the
plaintiffs proposed to have an expert witness testify about "industry
standards for handling insurance claims."10 The district court excluded the expert's testimony on the ground that "any normal person could
figure out if [the insurer was] reasonable or unreasonable.""' The jury
found for the defendant insurer, and the plaintiff appealed.'

105. Id. at 847. The district court characterized the proposed testimony as a
"generalized critique on eyewitness credibility" and concluded that the testimony had little
probative value and would not assist the jury in determining the credibility of each
eyewitness. Id. at 846. The district court noted that the defendant "could question the
eyewitnesses and raise doubt about their testimony through cross-examination, jury
instructions, and closing arguments." Id.
106. Id. at 847 (quoting United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1357, 1359 (11th Cir.
1997)).
107. See Lauren Tallent, Through the Lens of Federal Evidence Rule 403: An
Examination of Eyewitness IdentificationExpert Testimony Admissibility in the Federal
Circuit Courts, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 765, 787 (2011) (stating that, although many
circuits "have recently begun to accept the scientific validity of eyewitness identification
experts," the "Eleventh Circuit is the last remaining circuit to mandate a per se rule of
exclusion for eyewitness identification expert testimony"). For a recent Supreme Court
case analyzing the reliability of eyewitness identifications, see Perry v. New Hampshire,
132 S.Ct. 716, 730 (2012) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
does not require the trial judge to pre-assess the reliability of an eyewitness identification
if the identification was not procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances bylaw
enforcement).
108. 481 F. App'x 584 (l1th Cir. 2012).
109. Id. at 585.
110. Id. at 586.
111. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the district court's
conclusion that the testimony would not have been helpful to the
jury."1' The court noted that, to prove that an insurer acted in bad
faith under Florida law, the plaintiffs had to "prove that the insurer did
not 'use the same degree of care and diligence as a person of ordinary
care and prudence should exercise in the management of his own business. '""'
The plaintiffs conceded that no Florida court had required
a plaintiff to present expert testimony to establish an insurance bad
faith claim, and the plaintiffs failed to show that "'any normal person'
would be unable to decide whether [the insurer] acted in bad faith
without the assistance of expert testimony."" 5 Because the plaintiffs
failed to establish that their expert's testimony would be helpful to the
jury's assessment of the insurer's
good or bad faith, the district court did
116
not abuse its discretion.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE USE OF EVIDENCE

IN CRIMINAL CASES

A.

The Confrontation Clause
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution"' provides a "bedrock procedural guarantee" to a criminal defendant by ensuring the right
to confront the witnesses against him."'
As interpreted by the
Supreme Court, the Confrontation Clause prohibits the prosecution from
offering into evidence a "testimonial" out-of-court statement unless the
declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant." 9 Thus, the Supreme
113. Id. at 587.
114. Id. (quoting Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla.
1980)).

115. Id. (citing Thompson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 34 F.3d 932, 939 (10th Cir.
1994) ("[J]urors may properly be viewed as capable of evaluating good and bad faith (just
as they regularly determine what constitutes the conduct of a 'reasonable' person) by
bringing their own common sense and life experience to bear.")).

116. Id.
117. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
118. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,42 (2004). The Sixth Amendment provides,
"[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with

the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
119. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. The Supreme Court in Crawford expressly declined to
offer a comprehensive definition of "testimonial." Id. at 68. In Davis v. Washington, the

Court noted that "[iut is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from
other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not

subject to the Confrontation Clause." 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006). Endeavoring to define
"testimonial" in the context of a police interrogation, the Court stated:
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Court has held, for example, that the prosecution may not introduce a
testimonial report asserting that the defendant's blood-alcohol content
was three times the legal limit unless the prosecution presents testimony
12 °
by a scientist who was actually involved in preparing the lab report.
2
' the Eleventh Circuit examined the
In United States v. Ignasiak,"
application of the Confrontation Clause to autopsy reports prepared by
non-testifying medical examiners.1 22 The defendant in Ignasiak was
a medical doctor charged with healthcare fraud and illegal drug distribution for operating an alleged "pill-mill" for prescription pain medications. 23 At trial, the government presented the testimony of a medical
examiner who conducted an autopsy of one of the defendant's patients
24
and determined that the patient died of "multiple drug intoxication."'
The district court admitted into evidence the medical examiner's autopsy
report for that patient. But during the medical examiner's testimony,
the district court also admitted, over the defendant's objection, five
autopsy reports of other patients who were not referenced in the
indictment. These reports were prepared by two other medical
examiners who did not testify at the trial. Each of the five autopsy
reports concluded that the cause of death was pharmaceutical drug
overdose. The medical examiner who did testify confirmed the concluand stated her agreement with
sions of the five other autopsy reports
25
the cause of death for each patient.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the defendant's convicThe court first concluded that the autopsy reports were
tions. 2'
"testimonial" evidence subject to the Confrontation Clause.'2 7 Citing

Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They
are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
Id. at 822.
120. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011) (holding that the
Confrontation Clause precludes the prosecution from introducing a forensic report
containing a testimonial certification through the in-court testimony of an analyst who did
not sign the document or personally observe the test).
121. 667 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2012).
122. Id. at 1220.
123. Id. at 1219-26.
124. Id. at 1224.
125. Id. at 1224-25.
126. Id. at 1239.
127. Id. at 1229-33.
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the Supreme Court's decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,'1 28
which held that a forensic laboratory report identifying a substance as
cocaine was testimonial, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the autopsy
reports were prepared by medical examiners who, under Florida law,
12
operated under the auspices of the Department of Law Enforcement.
The court further noted that the medical examiners were "not mere
scriveners reporting machine 'generated raw-data'--the testifying
medical examiner confirmed that the "observational data and conclusions
contained in the autopsy reports are the product of the skill, methodology, and judgment of the highly trained examiners who actually
performed the autopsy."3 ° Given the statutory framework and the
skill required in preparing the reports, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the autopsy reports were testimonial because they were "'made
under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably
to believe
that the statement would be available for use at a later
31
trial.""
Moreover, because the testifying medical examiner was not present
during the five autopsies she did not perform, "she was not in a position
to testify on cross-examination as to the facts surrounding how the
autopsies were actually conducted or whether any errors, omissions, or
mistakes were made." 32 Thus, her live, in-court testimony was not a
"constitutionally adequate surrogate for the actual medical examiner
who performed the autopsy." 3 3 Because the defendant had not had an
opportunity to cross-examine the medical examiners who prepared the
testimonial autopsy reports, the admission of those reports into evidence
violated the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause.'

128.

557 U.S. 305 (2009).

129. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d at 1230-31.
130. Id. at 1232.
131. Id. at 1232-33 (quoting Baker, 432 F.3d at 1203).
132. Id. at 1234.
133. Id. at 1233. As the Eleventh Circuit noted, the Supreme Court has rejected as
constitutionally inadequate this type of "surrogate" testimony. See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct.
at 2713-15 (2011). In Bullcoming, the Court rejected "surrogate" testimony by an analyst
who did not sign the testimonial certification or observe the performance of the test
reported in the certification, stating that "the analysts who write reports that the
prosecution introduces must be made available for confrontation even if they possess 'the
scientific acumen of Mine. Curie and the veracity of Mother Teresa.'" Id. (quoting
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 319 n.6).
134. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d at 1233. The court rejected the government's argument that
the Confrontation Clause error was harmless, concluding that the evidence of guilt was not
overwhelming. Id at 1235-37. After the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion in Ignasiak,
the Supreme Court issued a divided decision on a related issue in Williams v. Illinois. 132
S. Ct. 2221 (2012). In Williams, the Supreme Court considered whether the admission of
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Thus, in the Eleventh Circuit, the government cannot admit an autopsy
report prepared for trial unless the medical examiner who prepared the
report is unavailable
and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross5
examine. 13

B.

The Fifth Amendment PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution establishes an
additional check on the admissibility of evidence. The Fifth Amendment
provides that "[n]o person shall... be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself ....,136 This privilege "not only extends

'to answers that would in themselves support a conviction but likewise
embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence
needed to prosecute the claimant."" 7 In one of the Eleventh Circuit's
most important constitutional cases of the year, the court brought the
Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination into the digital
age.
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum,31' the court held that
a district court violated the Fifth Amendment by holding John Doe, the
target of a grand-jury subpoena, in contempt for refusing to decrypt hard
drives sought as part of a grand jury's child pornography investiga-

expert testimony about the results of DNA testing performed by non-testitring analysts
violated the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 2227. Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer, and
Alito concluded that the expert's testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause
because the statements on which the expert relied were not offered for the truth of the
matter asserted and because the DNA report was not generated to accuse anyone of a
crime or to create evidence for use at trial. Id. at 2228, 2243-44. Justice Thomas rejected
the plurality's reasoning concerning whether the statements were hearsay (in other words,
whether they were offered for their truth), but he agreed that the testimony did not violate
the Confrontation Clause because, in his view, the statements "lacked the requisite
'formality and solemnity' to be considered 'estimonial' for purposes of the Confrontation
Clause." Id. at 2255-64 (Thomas, J., concurring). The remaining four Justices dissented,
concluding that the presentation of the expert testimony violated the petitioner's rights
under the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 2264-65 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Williams does not
alter the conclusion in Ignasiak, because a majority of the Supreme Court continues to view
formal forensic reports (such as the autopsy reports in Ignasiak) as testimonial and
therefore subject to the Confrontation Clause.
135. Given the court's reliance on the Florida statutory scheme to determine that the
autopsy reports were testimonial, the possibility remains open that the court's analysis
would be different for autopsy reports prepared under different statutory schemes in
Georgia or Alabama.
136. Id.
137. Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17,20 (2001) (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S.
479, 486 (1951) (alteration omitted)).
138. 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012).
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tion." 9 In 2011, Doe was served with a subpoena duces tecum requiring him to appear before a grand jury and produce the unencrypted
contents of five external hard drives and the hard drives from two laptop
computers. Doe informed the U.S. Attorney that he would appear before
the grand jury but that he would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and refuse to testify.14 ' The U.S. Attorney
applied to the district court for an order granting
Doe limited immunity
14
and requiring him to respond to the subpoena. '
Doe and the U.S. Attorney then appeared before the district court, and
the U.S. Attorney requested that the court grant Doe immunity "limited
to the use [of Doe's] act of production of the unencrypted contents of the
hard drives."'
This "act-of-production" immunity would not extend
to the government's derivative use of the contents of the hard drives in
a future criminal prosecution (assuming, of course, that the government
found incriminating information on the drives). In accord with the U.S.
Attorney's request, the district court granted Doe the limited "act-ofproduction" immunity and declined to grant immunity for any derivative
use of the contents of the hard drives. After the hearing, Doe again
appeared before the grand jury and again refused to decrypt the hard
drives. The district court1 43
then ordered Doe to show cause why he should
not be held in contempt.

At the show-cause hearing, Doe explained that he invoked his Fifth
Amendment privilege because the court's immunity order permitted the
government to use the decrypted contents of the hard drives obtained as
a result of his immunized testimony. 4 Doe also argued that he
should not be held in contempt because he was unable to decrypt the

139. Id. at 1352-53.
140. Id. at 1337.
141. Id. at 1338. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6003, a U.S. Attorney may obtain an order
from the district court requiring an individual to give testimony or provide other
information that he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination. If the district court issues an order requiring the witness to testify,
the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege
against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under
the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony
or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except
a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply
with the order.
18 U.S.C. § 6002.
142. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1338 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
143. Id.
144. Id. Doe appeared without counsel at both the first hearing and the show-cause
hearing. Id. at 1338 n.5 & n.6.
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hard drives. 145 In response, the government offered the testimony of
a forensic examiner, who testified that the hard drives were encrypted
with a software program called "TrueCrypt."1' The software program
creates partitions within a hard drive so that other parts of the hard
drive remain secured even if one part of the hard drive is accessed. The
forensic examiner acknowledged that, because the hard drives were
encrypted, the government was unable to recover any data at all from
the hard drives. Although he believed that there was data on the hard
drives, the forensic examiner conceded on cross-examination that it was
possible that the hard drives contained nothing.147 This possibility
existed because the TrueCrypt software fills free space on the encrypted
drive with random data, and no part of encrypted data can be distinguished from the random data generated by the software to fill the free
space.'48 At the end of the hearing, the district court found Doe in
contempt and remanded him to the custody of the U.S. Marshal.14 9
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted Doe had to prove three things
to show that the Fifth Amendment applied: "(1) compulsion, (2) a
testimonial communication or act, and (3) incrimination." 150

The

government conceded elements one and three-that Doe's decryption and
production of the decrypted hard drives would be compelled 5 ' and
incriminatory.'52 Thus, the only issue was whether decryption of the
hard drives-and the act of producing the contents of those hard
drives-would constitute a testimonial act under the Fifth Amendment.

53

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that "an act of production can be
testimonial when that act conveys some explicit or implicit statement of
fact that certain materials exist, are in the subpoenaed individual's
possession or control, or are authentic."'54 However, the Fifth Amend-

145. Id. at 1338.
146. Id. at 1340.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1340 n.11.
149. Id. at 1340.
150. Id. at 1341.
151. For a recent analysis of compulsion for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, see
United States v. Gannaway, 477 F. App'x 618, 621 (11th Cir. 2012) "[Blecause the
'touchstone of the Fifth Amendment is compulsion,' the use of both direct and indirect
economic sanctions used to compel testimony are violative of the Fifth Amendment." Id.
(quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977)).
152. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1341.
153. Id. at 1342.
154. Id. at 1345. The court derived this rule by reconciling two Supreme Court cases,
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), and United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27
(2000). In Fisher, the Internal Revenue Service sought to obtain documents prepared by
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ment privilege is not triggered if the government "merely compels some
physical act," such as the production of a key to the lock of a strongbox,
or if the act of production will reveal only information about which the
government already knows,
"thereby making any testimonial aspect a
' 55
'foregone conclusion. "
Applying these principles to the government's demand that Doe
decrypt the hard drives, the Eleventh Circuit first concluded that the
decryption was not a mere physical act-the act of decrypting the hard
drives "would be tantamount to testimony by Doe of his knowledge of the
existence and location of potentially incriminating files; of his possession,
control, and access to the encrypted portions of the drives; and of his
capability to decrypt the files."1' Furthermore, the government had
not shown that it already knew about the existence or the whereabouts
of any fies that were on the encrypted drives.'57 In fact, the government's forensic examiner conceded that the encryption software
precluded him from determining whether there were any files at all on
the hard drives. 5 ' Under these circumstances, the court concluded
that the Fifth Amendment protected Doe's refusal to decrypt the hard
drives. 159 Accordingly, the court reversed the civil contempt judgment

accountants that the taxpayers had given to their attorneys, and the district court ordered
production of the documents over the taxpayers' assertion of the Fifth Amendment
privilege. 425 U.S. at 393-95. The Supreme Court noted that the taxpayers' act of
production itself might qualify as testimonial: "Compliance with the subpoena tacitly
concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control by the
taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described
in the subpoena." Id. at 410. But in the cases before it, the Court concluded that
production of the subpoenaed documents would not be testimonial because "the existence
and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and the taxpayer adds little or nothing
to the sum total of the Government's information by conceding that he in fact has the
papers." Id. at 411. In Hubbell, a grand jury investigating the Whitewater Development
Corporation issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring Hubbell to produce certain categories
of documents. Hubbell invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege, and the district court
granted Hubbell immunity. After Hubbell turned over more than 13,000 pages of
documents in response to the subpoena, the grand jury indicted him on federal charges.
The district court dismissed the indictment, finding that the government could not show
that it knew the contents of the documents from a source independent of the documents
themselves. 530 U.S. at 30-32. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, concluding that
Hubbell's "act of production had a testimonial aspect, at least with respect to the existence
and location of the documents sought by the Government's subpoena." Id. at 45.
155. In re GrandJury Subpoena,670 F.3d at 1345-46 (quoting Fisher,425 U.S. at 411).
156. Id. at 1346.
157. Id. at 1346-47.
158. Id. at 1347.
159. Id. at 1349. Although the Fifth Amendment protected Doe, the district court still
could have compelled him to turn over the encrypted contents-and held him in contempt
if he failed to do so-if the district court had granted Doe "constitutionally sufficient
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entered against Doe, and he was released from the custody of the U.S.
Marshal. 6 '
Another recurring Fifth Amendment issue arises in the context of
trial. Specifically, a prosecutor may not comment on a criminal
defendant's failure to testify in his own defense because to do so would
impose a penalty for exercising the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. 6 ' In United States v. Wilmoth, 62 the court found
the prosecutor's comment on the defendant's silence so improper that the
court rebuked the prosecutor by name in its opinion. 16 The defendant
in Wilmoth was charged with conspiracy to violate the Clean Water
Act' by dumping grease from local restaurants into the public sewer
system.'6 5 During his opening statement, the defendant's counsel
stated, "[Witness] Clark wanted to take off and do things on his private
time. He said I'm on commission and I can do what I want to. One day
the evidence will show

.

,166

The prosecutor interrupted and said,

"I object. If [the defendant] wants to testify to this, that's fine." 67 The
district court promptly overruled the objection. 66 The defendant later
moved for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor had improperly
commented on the defendant's silence, but the district court denied the
motion and issued a curative instruction to which the defendant did not

immunity." Id. at 1349-50. But in Kastigarv. United States, the Supreme Court held that
the Fifth Amendment privilege requires immunity from use and derivative use. 406 U.S.
441, 448-49 (1972). Because the district court granted only "act-of-production" immunity,
which would have allowed the government to use the contents of the hard drives obtained
as a result of Doe's act of production, the district court's immunity was constitutionally
insufficient. In re GrandJury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1351-52.
160. In re GrandJury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1353.
161. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
162. 476 F. App'x 448 (11th Cir. 2012).
163. Id. at 452.
164. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (2006) (imposing criminal penalties for knowingly
discharging a pollutant into a publicly owned wastewater treatment facility except in
compliance with applicable regulations); 40 C.F.R. § 403.5(b)(8) (2012) (prohibiting
discharge of any trucked or hauled pollutants, except at discharge points designated by
publicly owned treatment works).
165. Wilmoth, 476 F. App'x at 449. The defendant was the president and manager of
a company that the restaurants hired to transport and dispose of their grease in accord
with state and federal regulations. Id.
166. Id. at 452.
167. Id.
168. Id.

952

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

object. 6 s The jury convicted the defendant of conspiracy and of several
violations of the Clean Water Act. 7 °
The defendant argued on appeal that the district court erred in
7
denying a mistrial based on the prosecutor's improper comment.'1
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the prosecutor's comment was "inexcusable" and "could have had no purpose other than to suggest to the jury
that [the defendant] could testify to whether Clark could take time off
if he wanted to."' 72 The court appeared to have been particularly
irritated because the prosecutor had served as co-counsel in a previous
prosecution "involving an almost identical violation. " 173 But despite
the prosecutor's "want of professionalism," the court concluded that the
prosecutor's remarks were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light
of the district court's curative instruction to the jury and the substantial
evidence of the defendant's guilt.'74
Accordingly, the defendant's
175
convictions were affirmed.

169. Id. The defendant initially declined to move for a mistrial but later changed his
mind. Id.
170. Id. at 449. Although the government charged the defendant with intentionally
violating the Clean Water Act, the jury convicted the defendant of lesser-included offenses
of negligently violating the Act. Id.
171. Id. at 452.
172. Id. at 452-53. A prosecutor's comments violate the Fifth Amendment if they "were
manifestly intended to urge the jury to draw an inference from the defendant's silence that
he or she is guilty, or whether a jury would naturally and necessarily construe the
prosecutor's remarks as inviting such an impermissible inference." United States v.
Thompson, 422 F.3d 1285, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005).
173. Wilmoth, 476 F. App'x at 453. The previous prosecution earned a reprimand from
the Fifth Circuit. See United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 349 (5th Cir. 2008). In the
previous prosecution, the prosecutor objected, during defense counsel's cross-examination
of a government witness, as follows: "Your honor, he's just simply testifying. If they want
to put [the defendant] on to say what happened. But he's testiIying. I object to it." Id. at
349 n.131.
174. Wilmoth, 476 F. App'x at 453.
175. Id.

